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
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
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
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
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## About the Author

PATRICK WARDLE is the founder of Objective-See, a nonprofit that creates open source macOS security tools. He spends his time finding Apple zero-days, analyzing macOS malware, speaking at global security conferences, and writing tools to protect Mac users around the world. He has also worked at NASA and the NSA, making him intimately familiar with aliens, spies, and talking nerdy.



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